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Editors’Summary
THE BROOKINGS PANEL ON Economic Activity held its seventy-
sixth conference in Washington, D.C., on September 4 and 5, 2003. This
issue of Brookings Papers on Economic Activity includes the papers and
discussions presented at the conference. The ﬁrst paper examines the
Mexican economy since Mexico liberalized its ﬁnancial markets and con-
cludes that its disappointing performance is due, in important part, to
inadequate domestic reforms. The second paper takes a fresh look at
understanding the factors behind economic growth over the past forty
years, using the experience of eighty-four countries at various stages of
development. The third paper looks at how the U.S. productivity surge
since the mid-1990s affects our understanding of productivity trends and
cycles, and how this might inform future projections. The fourth paper
looks for evidence of a bubble in current housing prices. 
AFTER MEXICO LIBERALIZED ITS foreign trade and ﬁnancial transactions
beginning in the mid-1980s and joined the North American Free Trade
Area (NAFTA) in 1994, it was widely expected that exports would boom,
contributing to exceptional economic growth. These expectations have
not been met. Mexico experienced a ﬁnancial crisis in late 1994, from
which it recovered with substantial help from the United States. Its
exports did rise sharply but then stagnated along with GDP starting in
2001. And on average since liberalization began, Mexico’s economic
growth has been unexceptional. Mexico’s experience, along with the
ﬁnancial crises that beset a wide range of other emerging market
economies during the 1990s, raised a number of still-unsettled questions
about the beneﬁts and costs of ﬁnancial liberalization. Although liberal-
ization promoted the inﬂow of capital from abroad, aiding economic
expansion, all too often that foreign capital ﬂowed out just as freely, pre-
cipitating crises in some countries and contributing to them in others. In
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Lorenza Martínez provide a new analysis of how liberalization affects
emerging market economies. In their view, liberalization does promote
growth by easing ﬁnancial constraints. But in the process it adds to risk
taking in the ﬁnancial sector, which makes the economy more vulnerable
to crisis. How much more risk, and how vulnerable the economy
becomes, depend on the ability of lenders to enforce contracts with bor-
rowers and on the prospects for a bailout of the banking sector should a
ﬁnancial crisis occur; these factors in turn depend on certain characteris-
tics of domestic economic and legal institutions. The authors examine
these ideas empirically and use the results to inform an extensive analysis
of Mexico’s recent experience. 
The authors begin with an empirical model of the economic linkages
among liberalization, ﬁnancial fragility, and growth. They use a sample of
ﬁfty-two countries whose ﬁnancial markets have achieved a certain level
of development, as indicated by a minimum level of activity in their stock
markets, and for which data are available for the period 1980–99. The
countries are partitioned into seventeen that are judged to have a high
degree of contract enforceability (high-enforceability countries, or HECs)
and thirty-ﬁve that have medium contract enforceability (MECs). The
HECs include the Group of Seven large industrial countries and ten others
for which an index of the prevalence of the rule of law exceeds a thresh-
old value; all had liberalized both their trade and their ﬁnancial markets
before the start of the sample period. Many of the MECs opened their
markets during the sample period, and the authors date these openings by
when a trend break occurs in the country’s trade or capital ﬂows or when
the ratio of trade or capital ﬂows to GDP exceeds a threshold value. The
dates identiﬁed by this process are similar to those found by earlier
researchers. 
From these datings and from data on the economic performance of
each country, the authors infer a number of stylized facts. One is that
trade liberalization has typically preceded ﬁnancial liberalization in
MECs. Another is that both trade liberalization and ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion are associated with faster GDP growth. This conclusion emerges
from several speciﬁcations of both cross-sectional and panel regressions
explaining growth in GDP per capita, all of which include initial GDP per
capita, educational attainment (secondary schooling), population growth,
and life expectancy as control variables. The estimates indicate that ﬁnan-
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capita by between 1.7 and 2.8 percentage points a year in the sample
period. A third stylized fact is that ﬁnancial liberalization is also associ-
ated with ﬁnancial deepening, as revealed by a higher mean level of credit
growth, but also with greater ﬁnancial fragility, captured in negative
skewness in credit growth over time. The identiﬁcation of skewness with
ﬁnancial fragility follows from additional stylized facts about boom-bust
cycles in these countries: the typical pattern of rapid credit growth during
booms, abrupt declines in credit during the rare crisis, and slow credit
growth in the wake of the crisis gives rise to negative outliers in the dis-
tribution of credit growth. For the MECs, panel regressions explaining
economic growth show a positive association with mean credit growth
and with negative skewness of credit growth. However, the sign on nega-
tive skewness becomes negative when the trade and ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion variables are added. These results are consistent with the idea that
liberalization without crisis is best, that ﬁnancial fragility is a common
by-product of liberalization, and that liberalization is good for growth on
balance despite the added fragility. 
The authors outline a model that is consistent with these broad results
and use it to examine more closely the mechanism through which liberal-
ization affects the economy. (An appendix to the paper provides a formal
theoretical extension of the model applied in the text.) Asymmetries
between the tradables (T) and the nontradables (N) sectors are a central
feature of the model. T-sector ﬁrms have relatively unconstrained access
to international capital markets through their commercial relations with
foreign ﬁrms and their ability to pledge export receivables as collateral.
Most N-sector ﬁrms do not. Except for the largest among them (mainly
ﬁrms in telecommunications, energy, and ﬁnance), N-sector ﬁrms depend
primarily on domestic bank credit, where their borrowing capacity is con-
strained because lenders know that contracts are not reliably enforceable.
However, the banks are partly protected against the effects of systemic
crises by implicit or explicit government guarantees that they will be
bailed out in the event of a systemwide crisis. This creates incentives for
the banks to channel resources to N-sector ﬁrms. These systemic guaran-
tees amount to a subsidy that reduces capital costs and encourages risk
taking by both lenders and borrowers. In good times this makes credit
readily available to the N-sector as a whole. But the added risk is a threat
to the good times. In recent history the risks have mainly taken the form
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currency, while their assets, including loans to N-sector ﬁrms, remain
denominated in domestic currency. When capital inﬂows have reversed,
leading to a real depreciation, these mismatches have produced bankrupt-
cies and lending crises. A ﬁnal feature of the authors’ model relates the 
T-sector to the N-sector through real rather than ﬁnancial effects: an
important part of the output of the N-sector consists of inputs to the 
T-sector. Through this mechanism, not found in most other models that
distinguish between tradables and nontradables, prolonged weakness in
N-sector output can eventually constrain the output of the T-sector. 
By calculating the characteristic behavior of MECs in the three years
before and after a crisis and the conﬁdence intervals around the mean
behavior, the authors show that their model is consistent with the main
features of MEC performance over their 1980–99 data period. A crisis is
typically preceded by a real appreciation and a lending boom. During the
crisis there is a sharp real depreciation and a banking meltdown, followed
closely by a short-lived recession, a sharp decline in credit and investment
relative to GDP, and a boom in exports. The ratio of N-sector to T-sector
output rises in the years preceding the crisis and then, during the crisis,
quickly falls back to earlier levels. The authors associate this pattern with
the availability of credit to the two sectors, although they recognize that it
is also consistent with the changing relative demand for the output of the
two sectors in response to the variation in the real exchange rate. To sort
out these two effects, they explain the ratio of N-sector to T-sector output
in panel regressions that include as explanatory variables both credit
ﬂows and real depreciation as well as the authors’ indexes that date ﬁnan-
cial and trade liberalization and dummy variables for crisis and postcrisis
years. In these regressions both credit and the real exchange rate are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant and have sizable effects. The authors also compare
Mexico’s performance in the three years surrounding its mid-1990s crisis
with the characteristic patterns for all MECs. The most noticeable depar-
tures in the Mexican case, falling well outside the 95 percent conﬁdence
intervals around the mean performance, are rapid export growth after the
crisis, a precrisis surge in the credit-to-GDP ratio followed by a sharp
decline, and a large and sustained postcrisis decline in the N-to-T output
ratio.
Armed with their model and these general results for MECs, the
authors turn to the main object of their analysis, a detailed examination of
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Mexico’s mediocre growth performance, the recent stagnation in its
exports, and the effects of liberalization and NAFTA. By 1987 Mexico
had eliminated most of its nonagricultural trade barriers and had gone
from being a very closed economy to one of the most open in the world.
Financial liberalization began in 1989 and relaxed or eliminated regula-
tions restricting bank accounts, stock purchases by foreigners, and foreign
direct investment. Banks were privatized, and interest rate ceilings and
directed lending were eliminated, as were limits on various forms of
direct ﬁnancing by ﬁrms. NAFTA, which went into effect in January
1994, greatly reduced the uncertainty confronting investors by codifying
the rules of the game that the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican governments
would follow on economic and ﬁnancial matters. However, the authors
point to the lack of judicial reform before 2000, when new bankruptcy
laws were introduced, as a serious shortcoming in Mexico during this
period. 
In important respects, Mexico’s performance reﬂected these changes.
Between 1985 and 2000, nonoil exports soared from $12 billion to 
$150 billion, and the share of trade (imports plus exports) in Mexico’s
GDP rose from 26 percent to 64 percent. The credit-to-GDP ratio rose
from 13 percent in 1988 to 49 percent in 1994 (the crisis occurred in
December of that year), with credit to the N-sector rising the fastest. GDP
growth, which had averaged 2 percent a year in the 1980s, rose to 4 per-
cent during the ﬁve years preceding the crisis and was not far from the
mean for comparable MECs in the surrounding years. However, perfor-
mance on some fronts has been unusual and disappointing, particularly in
recent years. The N-to-T output ratio declined steadily from 1994 to 2000
and has recovered only slightly since. The real value of credit, which
declined sharply with the crisis, continued to fall through 2002, with most
of the decline in credit to N-sector ﬁrms. And exports and GDP have both
stagnated since the start of 2001. 
The authors examine these unusual developments more closely. In
order to judge how much of the recent stagnation can be attributed to
weakness in the U.S. economy, they estimate quarterly bivariate vector
autoregressions (VARs) relating Mexican export growth to U.S. import
growth and, separately, to growth in U.S. manufacturing. Both VARs
show that shocks originating in the United States account for about 
40 percent of the forecast error variance, and unexplained changes to
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when Mexican exports stagnated, on average the annual rate of Mexican
export growth is underpredicted by around 3 percentage points by the
VAR using U.S. imports, and by around 4 percentage points by the VAR
using U.S. manufacturing. 
In the authors’ model, an important factor accounting for this unex-
plained export weakness is the extended decline in credit to the N-sector
and the effect of this credit crunch in retarding N-sector investment,
which then causes the N-sector to become a bottleneck to T-sector pro-
duction, eroding the latter’s competitiveness. To support this interpreta-
tion, the authors provide a disaggregated analysis of Mexico’s export
performance since the mid-1990s crisis. From annual surveys of manu-
facturing, they calculate that N-sector inputs represented on average 
12.4 percent of total costs in manufacturing during 1994–99, with this
cost share ranging from 5 percent in some food industries to 28 percent
for some types of chemicals. Ranking manufacturing industries by this
cost share and calculating the cumulative export growth for industries in
the top and the bottom 20 percent of this ranking, they show that the
exports of the most N-sector-intensive industries fell sharply relative to
those of the least N-sector-intensive industries between 1998 and 2002.
The authors acknowledge that external factors, such as competing exports
from China, have also contributed to the weakness in Mexican exports.
But they argue that such external factors cannot explain this strongly
asymmetric export response across industries. 
The authors also discuss in detail the buildup of resources and lending
in the banking system before the crisis, the risks that developed on bank
and ﬁrm balance sheets as a result of this lending, and the credit crunch
that followed. In the early 1990s the large capital inﬂows that followed
ﬁnancial liberalization, together with a sharp reduction in public sector
borrowing, greatly expanded the banks’ capacity to lend to the private
sector. Because bank liabilities were often denominated in dollars,
whereas loans were often in pesos or went to households or N-sector ﬁrms
whose products were valued in pesos, banks were increasingly exposed to
currency risk. In early 1994, expectations apparently changed, because
capital inﬂows reversed, and a few months later a full-blown ﬁnancial cri-
sis developed. But the more unusual development was the extended credit
crunch that followed the crisis. The authors see two main reasons for the
credit crunch. The ﬁrst was a deterioration in contract enforceability:
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proved unwilling or unable to enforce payment, a culture of nonpayment
developed. This lax enforcement not only led to increased problems for
lenders but, the authors believe, also showed up in greater tax evasion and
more crime in general. The second reason is the inadequate policy
response to the problem of nonperforming loans on banks’ balance sheets,
which, in the event, kept the share of such loans rising and kept banks
from increasing their capital in order to make new loans. Starting in 2000,
new steps have been taken on both contract enforcement and bank regula-
tion, but it is too early to judge their ﬁnal impact. 
Using microlevel data that distinguish ﬁrms by size, the authors pro-
vide evidence on the availability of funds and on the effects it has had on
business investment for ﬁrms in different parts of the economy. They
show that, in 1999, large ﬁrms (those with over $2.4 million in ﬁxed
assets) accounted for 64 percent of T-sector sales and only 12 percent of
N-sector sales. Only large ﬁrms are listed on Mexico’s stock exchange,
and only they issue bonds or equities, and their issuance was sharply
higher in the years following the crisis than in the years preceding it. This
is evidence that these large ﬁrms were insulated from the effects of the
credit crunch. Turning to business investment, the authors show that only
the top quintile of T-sector ﬁrms increased their investment rate between
1994 and 1999. And, in a regression explaining investment rates across
the largest ﬁrms, they show that cash ﬂow was a more important determi-
nant of investment for nonexporters than for exporters in the wake of the
crisis, indicating that N-sector ﬁrms were more credit constrained. 
The authors conclude with some overall observations about Mexico’s
performance and the role that liberalization has played in it. They see the
beneﬁts of liberalization in the extraordinary growth of exports and for-
eign direct investment during the 1990s. And they see the lack of struc-
tural reform after 1995 and the inadequate and delayed response of policy
to the crisis as the main reasons for the disappointing growth of the past
few years. From their overall analysis of MECs, they conclude that ﬁnan-
cial liberalization raises growth rates even though it leads to occasional
crises. Although the reforms they discuss for Mexico would reduce the
risk of crisis and encourage a prompt recovery should another crisis
occur, they judge that liberalization is on balance beneﬁcial even without
such reforms. And even though they share the view of most analysts that
foreign direct investment is the safest form of capital inﬂow, they reason
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provide the main source of external ﬁnance for most N-sector ﬁrms. 
IN THE HALF CENTURY SINCE the classic study by Robert Solow that ﬁrst
attempted to determine the contribution of capital deepening to economic
growth in the United States, a vast literature has applied variations of
Solow’s basic framework to account for growth in a wide variety of coun-
tries and time periods. Such studies initially focused on more advanced
industrial economies for which adequate data were available, but the
development of multicountry data sets in the last decade has made it pos-
sible to construct growth accounts for most of the countries in the world.
Although these data promise to shed new light on what makes economies
grow, comparing economies at widely different stages of development
has ampliﬁed the importance of a range of measurement issues and has
left the answers to central questions about the growth process unsettled.
These same data have also been applied to regression analyses of growth,
many of which have not been constrained by the production function
framework embodied in growth accounting but instead consider different
combinations of a broad list of potential explanatory variables. This has
led to further proliferation of results but little convergence of expert opin-
ion about the determinants of growth. In the second paper of this volume,
Barry Bosworth and Susan Collins address some of the issues that lead to
this uncertainty, and they attempt to narrow the range of differences. They
do so within a framework that combines the discipline of growth account-
ing, which establishes the roles of capital formation and other determi-
nants, with regression analysis of a core set of explanatory variables that
have consistently been shown to be related to economic growth. 
Using data primarily from the World Development Indicators of the
World Bank, Bosworth and Collins construct growth accounts for eighty-
four countries that together represent 95 percent of world GDP and 
84 percent of world population for the period 1960–2000. Their core set
of accounts decompose growth in output per worker into growth in capital
per worker, increases in education per worker, and a residual, convention-
ally labeled total factor productivity (TFP). The authors note that TFP
captures not just increases in the technological efﬁciency of factors, as is
sometimes assumed, but also myriad other inﬂuences on output such as
ﬂuctuations in the utilization of capital, political turmoil, changes in gov-
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as natural resources, as well as any measurement or speciﬁcation errors.
Under the usual assumption that factor input shares are proportional to
factor productivities, a factor’s contribution to economic growth is its
own growth rate times its share. Data on the size of these shares do not
exist for many countries. However, where such data do exist, shares
appear to change very little over time, and capital’s share, once purged of
the incomes of the self-employed, appears to be much the same in devel-
oping and developed countries. Thus, for all the countries in their data set,
the authors assume the same constant-returns-to-scale, Cobb-Douglas
production function with a capital share of 0.35, the typical value for
Western industrial countries. The authors further assume that capital ser-
vices are proportional to the capital stock, which is estimated by a perpet-
ual inventory model using investment data from the World Bank that
extend back to 1950; labor services are given by the labor force adjusted
for educational attainment. For this adjustment they assume that a
worker’s human capital increases by 7 percent for each additional year of
schooling. Data that would allow the analysis to take into account unem-
ployment rates and average hours of work are not available for all the
countries in the sample.
Results are given by decade from 1960 to 2000 for each of seven world
regions and for the world as a whole. For the entire sample, output grew
on average by 4 percent a year, and output per worker by 2.3 percent a
year. Of that 2.3 percent, increases in physical capital per worker con-
tributed about 1 percentage point and growth in human capital attributable
to education about 0.3 percentage point, leaving 1 percentage point for the
residual, TFP. East Asia, even excluding China, was the fastest-growing
of the seven regions over these four decades, with output per worker
increasing by 3.9 percent a year on average. Interestingly, this rapid
growth does not appear to have resulted from these economies “catching
up” to the industrial leaders by adopting existing technology; had this
been the case, it would have shown up in larger increases in TFP. Rather,
increases in physical capital per worker in East Asia were more than twice
the global average, and gains in human capital were also above average.
Sub-Saharan Africa was the slowest-growing region, with output per
worker rising just 0.6 percent a year on average over the entire period.
Almost all of this modest growth reﬂected capital deepening, although
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry xvii
1790-00_ix-xl  1/6/04  2:49 PM  Page xviithis occurred at only about half the rate in the rest of the world. TFP
growth in this region was actually negative in three of the four decades as
well as over the entire period.
Despite roughly equal contributions of capital accumulation and TFP
for the sample as a whole, substantial variation was observed in their rel-
ative performance across regions and time. Across regions of the world
excluding China, capital’s contribution ranges from a high of 2.7 percent
a year for the decade of the 1970s in East Asia to –0.1 percent for sub-
Saharan Africa in the 1990s. TFP’s contribution ranges from a high of 
2.6 percent a year in the Middle East in the 1960s to a low of –2.3 percent
a year in Latin America in the 1980s. 
The authors observe that previous studies, using either regression
analysis or growth accounting, have reached surprisingly different con-
clusions about the relative contributions of capital and TFP. For example,
Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, and David Weil conclude that differ-
ences in physical and human capital account for roughly 80 percent of the
international variation in income per capita, whereas Peter Klenow and
Andrés Rodriguez-Clare report that factors captured in the TFP residual
account for 90 percent of cross-country variation in growth rates. The use
of levels of capital and income in the ﬁrst of these studies and their
growth rates in the second may be one reason to expect differences across
these studies and others like them. But beyond that, Bosworth and Collins
suggest that different ways of dealing with three key measurement issues
are primarily responsible for such dramatic differences. 
One of these issues is how to measure growth in capital services. For
this some analysts use the investment share of GDP rather than the rate of
growth of capital itself. In growth regressions this avoids the need to
specify an initial capital stock and assume a rate of its depreciation. But
Bosworth and Collins argue that many countries are far from their steady
state, and unless the ratio of output to capital is relatively constant, the
investment rate can be a poor proxy for growth in capital. The authors ﬁnd
it implausible that this ratio is constant across a diverse sample of coun-
tries, and so they argue for using direct measures of capital growth rather
than the investment share. And they show that, in their own broad sample,
there is very little correlation between the change in the capital stock and
the mean investment rate, even over a period as long as forty years. The
newly industrializing economies of Asia, for example, have very high
capital growth rates but do not devote unusually large shares of output to
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growth in output and of capital, have relatively high average investment
shares. As would be expected given these facts, in a wide variety of
growth regressions that differ in terms of the time period examined and
the menu of explanatory variables, the authors ﬁnd that changes in the
capital stock explain far more of growth in output per worker than invest-
ment rates do. 
A second measurement issue is what price concept to use. Bosworth
and Collins argue that the choice of international prices (that is, prices
adjusted for purchasing power parity), rather than prices in local currency
converted at current exchange rates, makes sense in cross-country com-
parisons of standards of living but is less obviously suitable for growth
accounting. In particular, in a growth accounting context, the authors
believe that local currency prices should be used, because ﬁrms base their
production decisions on the relative prices of capital and labor in their
domestic markets. The choice makes a substantial difference in the
results. Conversion to international prices can dramatically change mea-
sured investment shares, systematically reducing them in low-income
countries while raising them in most developed countries. The authors
report that, in their eighty-four-country sample, the correlation between
average investment measured in these two ways is only 0.52. They also
ﬁnd that, across countries, there is almost no correlation between the
investment share measured in domestic prices and income per capita,
whereas when international prices are used, a strong positive correlation
is observed. The importance of the choice of pricing metric is therefore
central when trying to explain differences in growth in output by invest-
ment’s share. The choice also makes a difference in explaining differ-
ences in the level of income. It is much less important in equations
explaining growth in output by the rate of growth of capital, since the
ratio of international to domestic prices is relatively constant. 
The third issue discussed by the authors is conceptual. Investment in
capital is potentially endogenous: it may well respond to changes in TFP.
In a growth regression this creates an obvious econometric problem, bias-
ing upward the estimated coefﬁcient on the growth of capital. But even if
the econometric problem is absent, as in the authors’ growth accounting
where the elasticity of output with respect to capital is assumed to be
known, the question of whether capital should get “credit” when the out-
put change was caused by a change in TFP remains. Some researchers
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output ratio, implicitly giving credit to TFP, or to any other factors recog-
nized in the growth accounting (such as human capital), for the capital
additions needed to maintain the capital-output ratio. Some go further and
also credit TFP for the changes in human capital required to keep up with
output. Such assumptions automatically increase the credit given to TFP.
The authors note that these assumptions give extreme estimates. Even if
one wants to attribute to technical change whatever growth in output
arises from increases in capital that that technical change induces, many
unmeasured factors other than technical change will be captured by the
TFP residual and may affect both output and capital. Furthermore, causa-
tion can run two ways, with technical change itself induced by investment
embodying new technology. The authors note that in most growth
accounting studies, as in their paper, the focus is not on the deep, ultimate
causes of the changes in observed factors but on the proximate sources of
growth. For that purpose the growth in capital, rather than in the capital-
output ratio, is the relevant variable.
In the authors’ growth accounting, what fractions of the variation in
growth in output per worker across countries are explained by changes in
the measured factors, capital and education, and what fraction by the TFP
residual? The authors report a decomposition of the variance of growth
using each country’s growth over the period 1960–2000 as an observa-
tion. If the growth rates of factors and of TFP were uncorrelated, the vari-
ance of output growth per worker would be the simple sum of the
variances of the growth attributed to each of the components. But if they
are not, as in their sample, the calculation also involves the sum of the
covariances. The authors report the decomposition of output per worker
for various assumptions about the allocation of these covariance terms. If
the covariance for any two components is split equally between them,
growth in the capital-labor ratio explains 43 percent of the cross-country
variance and TFP growth explains 54 percent. The contribution of growth
in the capital-labor ratio ranges from 27 to 57 percent, depending on
whether it is credited with none or all of its covariance, respectively, with
education and TFP. Growth in education explains only 3 percent when the
covariance is divided equally. Weighting countries by their population
modestly reduces the estimated contribution of capital and increases the
contribution of education. Not surprisingly, if growth in the capital-output
ratio is used as the measure of capital’s contribution, that contribution
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division of the covariance. The authors note that the covariance between
capital’s contribution and TFP switches from positive, when growth in
the capital-labor ratio is used for capital’s contribution, to negative, when
growth in the capital-output ratio is used. This suggests that even for
those who want to credit TFP for induced changes in capital, using the
capital-output ratio is going too far. Bosworth and Collins conclude that
both capital (physical and human) accumulation and improvements in
economic efﬁciency are central to the growth process, and that, for most
purposes, focusing on which is more important is misplaced. 
It is a widely held belief that human capital is important to productivity
and therefore that investment in education is an important element in any
strategy for development. This view is buttressed by a large body of
microeconomic evidence that ﬁnds a strong relationship between educa-
tion and earnings. But many studies at the macroeconomic level have
been unable to ﬁnd a correlation between economic growth and increased
educational attainment of the population. In the growth accounting just
discussed, education was a relatively minor factor in explaining differ-
ences in growth rates. Bosworth and Collins survey a number of micro-
and macroeconomic studies, discuss possible reasons for their divergent
results, and explore the sensitivity of the macroeconomic results to the
use of different measures of human capital and speciﬁcations of growth
equations. They identify three major reasons why the micro- and macro-
economic studies may come to different conclusions. One is that micro-
economic studies typically estimate private, not social, returns, and so
their estimated returns need not show up in GDP. It is sometimes argued
that an important role played by education—perhaps as important as
whatever education adds to an individual’s human capital—is simply
identifying those individuals who have high native ability. Although such
labeling may improve the allocation of labor among tasks of differing
requirements, and to that extent has some social value, such sorting is
likely to have far greater private than social returns. It is difﬁcult to design
studies that can distinguish between these types of return. But the authors
note that the natural experiment provided by instances of compulsory
education shows little evidence that private returns are biased upward.
Hence they do not see the distinction between private and social returns 
as resolving the puzzling difference between the macro- and the micro-
economic results. 
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that include extremely diverse economies, may account for the lack of
association between economic growth and education in econometric stud-
ies. Using measures of education that correct for classiﬁcation changes in
censuses of some industrial countries, some have found substantial effects
across that relatively homogeneous set of countries. Others have found
particular indicators of education that yield signiﬁcant results for a
broader list of countries. Bosworth and Collins analyze some of these data
sets but ﬁnd that although they are likely to show high correlations in
levels, they have much lower correlations in changes, particularly over
decades, and so can give quite different results. They explore various
strategies for dealing with these measurement problems, including the use
of instrumental variables and the use of a composite measure for educa-
tion, but conclude that although there is substantial evidence of measure-
ment error, there is no convincing way to choose among the different
measures.
A third problem in macroeconomic studies of the contribution of edu-
cation to growth is the difﬁculty of measuring differences in educational
quality. This is obviously a much greater problem for international com-
parisons than for studies of education within a country. The authors report
that an educational quality index generated by Eric Hanuschek and Den-
nis Kimko for a substantial number of countries, using indicators such as
enrollment rates and expenditure per student as well as years of school-
ing, population, and regional dummies, had a strong correlation with
changes in GDP per capita. Bosworth and Collins reestimate and extend
the Hanuschek-Kimko measure to their full set of eighty-four countries.
They perform a number of growth regressions, always including growth
in capital per worker, one or more educational variables (initial years of
schooling, a simple average of estimates of human capital from two inde-
pendent studies, and the index of educational quality), and in some cases
other characteristics of the economy in 1960, such as income, life
expectancy, and institutional quality. They ﬁnd only weak evidence of the
contribution of education to growth. Growth in human capital is signiﬁ-
cant only if the coefﬁcient on capital per worker is constrained to its
hypothesized value of 0.35, and the signiﬁcance of the educational quality
index disappears if institutional quality is included. 
The authors turn next to a more detailed regression analysis relating
countries’ growth over the 1960–2000 period to some basic measures of
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drawn from the existing empirical literature. They then use that speciﬁca-
tion to explore the extent to which the various determinants operate
through capital accumulation and through TFP. In their basic regression
the authors include ﬁve variables they consider exogenous—the initial
values of income per capita, life expectancy, and the logarithm of popula-
tion, along with a trade instrument (as a measure of a country’s predispo-
sition to trade) and a geographical factor that is a composite of average
days of frost and the proportion of the country’s area that lies in the trop-
ics. They experiment with proxies for institutional quality and settle on a
measure constructed by Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer from informa-
tion in the International Country Risk Guide. This variable is not predeter-
mined, since it is based on 1982 data and may well be endogenous,
reﬂecting actual growth and policy. These variables by themselves explain
75 percent of the variance in growth of output per worker over the forty-
year period, and all are statistically signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient on initial
income is negative and highly signiﬁcant, implying convergence. The
coefﬁcients on the other variables are all positive, implying that initial life
expectancy, trade, and institutional quality all have favorable effects on
growth. Adding three policy indicators—the average rate of inﬂation, the
government budget balance, and a measure of openness to trade—
improves the ﬁt of the equation only slightly, despite the likelihood that
these variables are endogenous. The variables have the expected sign, but
only the budget balance is statistically signiﬁcant. The authors ﬁnd it strik-
ing that there is relatively minor evidence of a direct role for conventional
government policies in improving growth performance. 
Since actual growth over the period is the sum of the contributions of
growth in capital per worker and the TFP residual calculated in the
growth accounting, separately regressing these two on the same list of
variables allocates the inﬂuence of each on growth between a capital and
a TFP “channel.” The results are suggestive. Institutional quality has a
more signiﬁcant inﬂuence on TFP, and trade a more signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the contribution of capital. The other variables have signiﬁcant effects
on both. Adding regional dummies has a modest effect on these coefﬁ-
cient estimates but typically reduces their statistical signiﬁcance. 
Regressions for growth using data over a forty-year period necessarily
obscure the remarkable collapse of growth in much of the global economy
in the last two decades. Bosworth and Collins document this decline. For
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rate of 2.5 percent in 1960–80 to only 0.8 percent in 1980–2000. They
show that the decline was similar in industrial and developing countries
and is apparent in all regions except South Asia. Their growth accounting
shows that lower rates of growth of both physical capital and TFP were
important contributors to the widespread decline. India and China are dra-
matic exceptions. China’s growth rate increased by almost 5 percentage
points between the two subperiods, and India’s by more than 2 percentage
points. Since these two countries represent fully 45 percent of the popula-
tion of the authors’ sample, the average growth rate actually increases
between subperiods when country observations are weighted by popula-
tion, giving quite a different picture of what the “typical” world citizen
experienced. Weighting observations by GDP results in a decline from
the ﬁrst to the second subperiod of 0.9 percentage point, an intermediate
result.
In order to understand the reasons for the general decline in growth, the
authors perform separate regressions for the two subperiods, using the
same speciﬁcation that was used for the entire forty-year period. The val-
ues of six of the nine variables change between subperiods, but the other
three—institutional quality, the trade instrument, and geography—are
ﬁxed. Overall, the regressions for the entire period and those for the two
subperiods are quite similar. Budget policy appears less important in the
second subperiod, whereas geography, institutional quality, trade, and the
measure of trade openness all appear more important, with higher statisti-
cal signiﬁcance. However, changes in the variables between subperiods
do not explain the general decline, accounting for only 15 percent of the
actual change in GDP growth between subperiods. Changes in the vari-
ables imply faster growth in the second subperiod for all regions and for
developing countries as a group; they imply slower growth for industrial
countries but account for only about half of the actual slowdown. It is
clear that most of the decline in the average growth rate is reﬂected in the
shift in the intercept and changes in the coefﬁcients on geography and
trade. Formal tests show that the changes in structure between the two
subperiods are statistically signiﬁcant. The subperiod regressions allocat-
ing the effects of the explanatory variables between capital deepening and
TFP show that changes in the effect of geography, institutional quality,
and trade are concentrated in the TFP component. 
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explaining the growth decline is that the regression analysis focused on
identifying factors that explain performance across countries rather than
factors that would explain variations over time. They note, however, that
the equations do predict an acceleration of growth for China, largely due
to a large improvement in life expectancy, and predict a slowing of
growth in the industrial countries, largely due to a deterioration in gov-
ernment budgets and a reduced role for convergence within this group.
The authors also examine growth regressions for various subgroups of
countries, ﬁnding surprisingly small differences between determinants of
growth between higher- and lower-income countries over the entire time
period, but also evidence that the shifts in parameter estimates across
periods are more substantial for the lower-income countries. 
The authors conclude that growth accounting and growth regressions
can yield consistent and useful results. They believe their study conﬁrms
that a very large portion of cross-country variation in economic growth
over the past forty years can be related to differences in initial conditions
and government institutions, and that there is robust evidence of conver-
gence. However, they ﬁnd that the difﬁculties of accurately measuring
educational quality and attainment leave unanswered the contribution of
education to growth. And they are disappointed that the variables shown
to be important for explaining differences in growth across countries pro-
vide little insight into the reduction in average growth rates during the last
twenty years, and that they ﬁnd only a minor role for economic policy in
boosting countries’ growth performance.
EVER SINCE PRODUCTIVITY accelerated in the second half of the 1990s
and unemployment fell to its lowest level in thirty years, analysts have
worked at understanding the reasons behind this surprising performance
of the economy and the implications for the future. Because productivity
has a pronounced procyclical component, it had been unclear what por-
tion of these rapid productivity gains was a transient cyclical develop-
ment. Thus the renewed acceleration of productivity in the past several
quarters, resulting in rapid average gains during a period when unemploy-
ment rose, has been informative, suggeesting that there is indeed an
important continuing component of the productivity resurgence. In the
third paper of this volume, Robert Gordon analyzes these developments
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productivity gains of recent years, understanding the behavior of produc-
tivity over a business cycle, and projecting the likely trends in productiv-
ity and output growth in the next twenty years. 
Estimating the underlying trend in productivity is the starting point for
Gordon’s analysis. Total output of the economy, GDP, can be decom-
posed into the product of ﬁve terms: output per hour (productivity), hours
per employee (average hours), employment as a fraction of the labor force
(the employment rate), the labor force as a fraction of the working-age
population (the labor force participation rate), and the working-age popu-
lation. Because productivity is reported quarterly for the nonfarm busi-
ness sector, it is useful to work with productivity and average hours for
that sector and then get back to GDP by adding two more terms that relate
total output to nonfarm business output (what Gordon calls the “mix
effect”), and nonfarm business employment (from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ payroll data) to total employment (from the BLS’s household
survey). Since the product of these seven terms is GDP, the growth rate of
GDP is given by the sum of their growth rates. 
To illustrate the contribution of each term to GDP growth over time,
Gordon divides the period 1954-2001 into six intervals between bench-
mark quarters that he regards as roughly comparable points in business
cycles. Productivity growth makes a positive contribution to GDP growth
in all six periods, but its average annual growth rate varies between 1.2
and 2.7 percent across periods. Population growth contributes between
1.1 and 1.9 percent over the intervals, and a rising participation rate con-
tributes between a barely positive amount and 0.7 percent. Average hours
decline between zero and 0.6 percent. The other terms are smaller and
vary between positive and negative over the intervals. 
To go beyond this rough characterization using trend benchmark quar-
ters (what he calls the trends-through-benchmark, or TTB method), Gor-
don turns to a more formal analysis of productivity using ﬁlter techniques.
One is the familiar Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) ﬁlter, which estimates a time-
varying trend by simply smoothing time series on actual productivity.
Gordon experiments with a number of alternative smoothing parameters
and settles on one by judgmentally examining the variations in trend it
produces. Because cyclical variations in productivity are so pronounced,
the estimated H-P trends are contaminated by an unknown amount of
cyclical variation. That leads him to try a second technique, a Kalman
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varying trend. For his cyclical adjustment, Gordon utilizes the output gap
calculated as the difference between actual GDP and the broken trends
using his TTB method, and he uses the current and four leading values of
changes in this gap as additional explanatory variables in the Kalman
ﬁlter. He chooses a degree of smoothing that, with the cyclical adjustment
suppressed, gives an estimated trend resembling the preferred H-P esti-
mated trend. The ﬁnal Kalman ﬁlter trend is then obtained by reestimating
using this degree of smoothing, but including the output gap variables.
The resulting trend is noticeably different from the H-P estimate and rela-
tively free of transient cyclical variation.
The differences in the estimates of trend growth rates using these two
methods are most noticeable in the early years of the estimation period,
1955–70, and at the end of the sample, 2000–03. The H-P ﬁlter estimates
show a strong surge in productivity from 1955 to 1963, followed by a
steady decline to the late 1970s. The Kalman ﬁlter estimates show little
variation in productivity growth until the early 1970s, followed by a
steady decline to the late 1970s. The terminal growth rate of the produc-
tivity trend in mid-2003 is estimated at 3.4 percent a year using the
Kalman ﬁlter, 0.7 percentage point faster than the H-P estimate. Con-
fronted with these differences, Gordon chooses an average of the produc-
tivity trends estimated by these two techniques as his ﬁnal estimate. He
then repeats the procedure to estimate time-varying trends for ﬁve of the
remaining six terms in the GDP identity. (Where trends are estimated
from growth rates, the levels of the trend are calculated by constraining
the average ratio of actual to trend to equal zero over the entire
1954:4–2003:2 sample period.) The exception is the employment rate,
which is 1 minus the trend unemployment rate. Gordon identiﬁes trend
unemployment with the NAIRU. Because ﬁlter estimates of the employ-
ment rate trend do not imply a very slowly changing NAIRU like that he
has found successful in previous work, Gordon relies instead on the TTB
method. This results in an employment rate trend that rises gradually from
94 percent in the late 1980s to 95 percent by 2001 and identiﬁes the
period from late 1996 to late 2001 as an episode in which unemployment
remained below the NAIRU. From the trends in each of the components,
Gordon calculates the trend values and growth rates for GDP. 
Gordon uses these estimates of trends in GDP and its components to
examine the cyclical behavior of the economy as originally expressed in
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age deviation from trend. For each of the components, Gordon regresses
the change in this deviation on the change in the deviation of GDP (with
zero to four lags, except in regressions for productivity, where four leads
are used), the lagged dependent variable (with four lags), an error correc-
tion term (the lagged log ratio of actual to trend), and an end-of expansion
(EOE) dummy variable that uses seven leads, which his earlier work
found to be important in explaining cyclical productivity. Conﬁrming
Okun’s original analysis, he ﬁnds a signiﬁcant relationship between devi-
ations in GDP and deviations in productivity, average hours, and the
employment rate, and smaller but also signiﬁcant effects of the variables
relating nonfarm business output to GDP. (In the 1960s Arthur Okun also
found effects from the labor force participation rate, but these are not sig-
niﬁcant in Gordon’s analysis when the last forty years are added to the
data.) The estimated short-run effect of a 1 percent deviation in output
from its trend is a 0.50 percent deviation of both productivity and the
employment rate and a 0.29 percent deviation in average hours worked.
The other terms, taken together, have small coefﬁcients. In steady state,
the productivity deviation falls to 0.33 percent and the employment rate
deviation to 0.41 percent, and the average hours deviation changes only
slightly. The steady-state relation between GDP and the employment rate
implies an Okun’s Law of 2.4. 
The surge in productivity in the last two or three years poses a special
challenge to any analysis. Gordon discusses this period in detail and con-
siders the predictions of alternative speciﬁcations of his productivity
equations in attempting to shed light on this episode. Although the pro-
ductivity trend he uses, which averages the H-P and Kalman ﬁlter esti-
mates, is rising by just over 3 percent a year during this period, the
equations still consistently underpredict actual productivity growth in the
quarters starting in early 2000. Gordon considers whether the typical EOE
effect may have been absent in the 2001 recession and the current recov-
ery. His estimates omitting the EOE effect do track actual productivity in
2000 and early 2001 closely, but they generate much larger underpredic-
tions in the subsequent quarters. The equations also substantially overpre-
dict productivity growth during 1993 to 1999, indicating the difﬁculty in
quantifying the changing trend throughout this entire period. Given the
decline of GDP relative to its trend from 2000:2 to 2003:2, the declines in
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values, although the participation rate declined by 0.26 percent a year
more than predicted. Thus developments in the labor market were not
unusual given the weakness in the economy. However, compared with
two earlier periods that Gordon examines, unusually large prediction
errors emerge in the two terms that reconcile GDP and nonfarm business
output. The ratio of GDP to nonfarm business output declined slightly,
whereas it was predicted to rise by 0.58 percent a year, and the ratio of
payroll to household employment fell by 0.13 percent a year more than
predicted. 
The acceleration of productivity during the past decade has been ana-
lyzed extensively, and Gordon critically reviews a number of possible
explanations that others have put forward. One of these focuses on
extreme cost cutting by ﬁrms as a factor behind the 2002–03 surge in pro-
ductivity. Gordon agrees that a number of developments put severe pres-
sure on corporate managers to cut costs, which led to unusually large
employment cuts. Reported proﬁts declined sharply after 2000, in part
because of the unwinding of accounting tricks that William Nordhaus
identiﬁed in a recent Brookings Paper, and the stock market collapsed.
Compensation that was geared to stock options vanished, and many pen-
sion funds that were invested in equities became seriously underfunded.
Another explanation centers on the delay that user industries often experi-
ence before realizing the beneﬁts of their investments in new technology
hardware and software. This explanation was originally articulated by
Paul David, who drew an analogy between the delayed beneﬁts that fol-
lowed the introduction and spread of electricity roughly a century ago and
those that followed the introduction and spread of computers and related
technologies in the last few decades. This explanation sees the recent
surge in productivity in user industries as the beneﬁt of investments in
information and communications technology (ICT) made in the 1990s.
The delay arises from the need to reorganize business practices in order to
achieve the beneﬁts of the new investments. 
A third and related explanation is based on the idea that measured ICT
investment is accompanied by unmeasured investment in intangible capi-
tal. This unmeasured investment consists of the resources that ﬁrms
devote to reorganizing, retraining, and otherwise acquiring the human
capital that is the necessary complement to the measured ICT investment.
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tured in measured output at the time they occur, the intangible capital
hypothesis asserts that output and productivity growth were understated
in the late 1990s when ICT investment boomed, and that that understate-
ment was partly reversed in recent years. Gordon estimates that the
effects of such mismeasurement, even if present, could account for only
part of the surprising recent surge in productivity. He also discusses the
possible role of greater outsourcing, labor market ﬂexibility, and mismea-
surement of hours worked but ﬁnds the evidence for effects on productiv-
ity from these sources to be slight or ambiguous. 
The trend growth in productivity is the principal determinant of growth
in real wages and, together with growth in the other elements of the GDP
decomposition analyzed above, determines the growth of potential GDP.
Projections of GDP growth, in turn, are an essential ingredient of long-run
budget forecasts and forecasts of future revenue for Social Security and
Medicare. Gordon applies the results of his historical analysis to project
potential GDP growth over the next twenty years and compares these pro-
jections with the current ofﬁcial projections for Social Security. He offers
several reasons for not projecting his 3.05 percent estimate of the current
trend in productivity growth for this long a period, noting that productiv-
ity growth over the past twenty years averaged just 2.03 percent and that
estimates of the trend changed sharply during that period. One is that the
extreme cost-cutting efforts that may have contributed to the recent pro-
ductivity surge cannot continue indeﬁnitely. A second is that the over-
statement of recent growth implied by the intangible capital hypothesis
will soon end. A third is that the pace of fruitful applications of ICT inno-
vations is likely to slow. And a fourth is that educational attainment in the
United States is reaching a plateau, so that the contribution of improving
labor quality to productivity will probably be smaller in the future than it
has been in recent decades. Taking all this into account, Gordon judges
that productivity growth over the next twenty years is likely to average
between 2.2 and 2.8 percent a year, and he uses 2.5 percent for his central
projection of productivity growth over this period. 
Turning to the other elements in the projection of potential GDP, Gor-
don takes issue with the population growth projections currently adopted
by the Social Security Administration’s Technical Panel on Assumptions
and Methods (TPAM). Population growth depends on fertility rates, mor-
tality rates, and net immigration. Gordon notes that the U.S. total fertility
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bearing age that would, absent immigration, maintain a constant popula-
tion in the long run. Although this is well above the fertility rates of 1.3 to
1.6 that characterize most other advanced industrial countries, Gordon
agrees with most demographers that the U.S. rate will remain near 2.0,
and he discusses some of the differences between the United States and
other rich countries that support this projection. He offers no disagree-
ment with the TPAM’s projection that mortality rates will decline in the
future at the same 0.84 percent a year rate that has characterized the last
ﬁfty years, and he accepts its projection of no change in average hours per
household employee. However, he argues that the TPAM projection of
net immigration is too low. Net annual immigration ranged between 0.6
and 1.0 percent of the population in the early years of the twentieth cen-
tury, declined to near zero between 1933 and 1947, and gradually rose to
0.4 percent in 2002, when net immigration (including illegal immigrants)
was 1.4 million. The TPAM projects a decline to a steady state of 900,000
a year after 2020. Gordon notes that net immigration has risen an average
of 3.75 percent a year since 1970, and he questions whether that growth
will switch to an absolute decline in the years ahead. He discusses alter-
natives to the TPAM projections that he ﬁnds more plausible. These make
a considerable difference in the seventy-ﬁve-year projections made for
Social Security’s purposes, but only a small difference over the next
twenty years. For that period, and taking account of all three elements of
population growth, Gordon projects that the working-age population will
grow at an average rate of just under 1 percent a year, somewhat slower
than the 1.2 percent annual growth over 1987–2003, but well above the
TPAM projection for labor force growth of 0.63 percent a year. He also
assumes no change in the trend employment rate or the labor force partic-
ipation rate, and he assumes a continuation of the recent 0.2 percent
annual decline in nonfarm output relative to GDP. Taken together, these
projections lead to projected growth of potential GDP averaging 3.28 per-
cent a year over the next twenty years.
Although Gordon does not attempt to model uncertainty in this projec-
tion in any formal way, or to quantify the uncertainties in the individual
elements from which it was generated, he is well aware of them. Growth
in productivity, population, and hours per employee are the three compo-
nents of the output identity that he regards as the most uncertain for long-
term projections. His own analysis of productivity identiﬁes substantial
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the estimated trend over just the past ten years. Economists have little
understanding of the forces behind these variations and, Gordon notes,
disagree about whether projections for the next two decades are best
informed by average growth over the past two years, the past eight, or the
past twenty. He concludes that “the only safe forecast is that we will be
surprised sooner rather than later.”
SINCE 1995, HOUSING prices in almost every U.S. metropolitan area have
been rising far more rapidly than incomes or than prices in general. And
despite the recession in 2001, prices of single-family homes, the volume
of house sales, and the number of housing starts have all remained at near-
record levels. Indeed, the resilience of housing sales (and of automobile
sales) has been a major factor preventing a deeper recession. In many
respects the rapid run-up of home prices, which is mirrored in most other
advanced economies, resembles the housing boom of the late 1980s,
which was most dramatic in California and Massachusetts. The fact that
those earlier housing price surges in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Boston were followed by housing busts in those areas has many observers
concerned that the United States today may be in a housing bubble, with
the risk of a damaging collapse. In the fourth paper of this volume, Karl
Case and Robert Shiller examine a range of evidence bearing on the like-
lihood of such an outcome. 
The authors distinguish between a housing boom and a housing bubble
but recognize that it is difﬁcult to tell the two apart. A housing boom
occurs when rapidly rising housing prices and high rates of construction
reﬂect favorable fundamentals, such as falling interest rates or rapidly ris-
ing incomes or wealth. A bubble, in contrast, is a situation in which such
price increases reﬂect expectations about future price increases that are
not justiﬁed by changes in fundamentals. Although such expectations can
be self-fulﬁlling for a time, as expectations of price increases beget price
increases, they are inherently unstable: a shock that disrupts those expec-
tations can induce a collapse. 
Case and Shiller ﬁrst examine the extent to which changes in funda-
mentals can explain observed ﬂuctuations in home prices. They construct
state-by-state home price data for the period 1985:1 to 2002:3, using
repeat-sales and appraisal indices, scaled to median home values in 1999.
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across states. For the seven states with the least volatile prices, the aver-
age ratio of home prices to personal income per capita is relatively low,
averaging about 2.3, and the ﬂuctuations in this ratio are quite modest,
with a standard deviation ranging from 0.04 to 0.09. In simple regressions
of home prices on income per capita, the latter by itself explains over 
99 percent of the variance of home prices for four of these states, and 
96 percent or more for the other three. Although this leaves little for other
variables to explain, the authors do ﬁnd that including a number of other
fundamentals—changes in population and employment, the unemploy-
ment rate, housing starts, the mortgage rate, and mortgage payment per
$1,000 of loan value—raises the R2 to 99 percent for all the least price-
volatile states. 
The picture is quite different for the eight states where home prices are
the most volatile (which include California and Massachusetts). For these
states the ratio of home price to income, averaged across states and time,
is almost triple that of the seven states with the least volatility. The stan-
dard deviations of this ratio range from 0.52 to 1.34, averaging over ten
times the average standard deviations of the low-volatility states. Not sur-
prisingly, for these states income per capita by itself explains much less of
the volatility of home prices, and other fundamentals appear more impor-
tant. In a regression in which income per capita is the only independent
variable, the unexplained variation in home prices, which was at most 
4 percent for the least price-volatile states, ranges from 17 to 55 percent
for the most price-volatile states. Inclusion of the other fundamental vari-
ables listed above typically cuts the unexplained variation roughly in half,
which leaves ample room for some of the price variation to be explained
by a bubble. 
The authors examine the explanatory potential of the fundamentals in a
variety of other regressions, using both levels and rates of change in vari-
ables, with similar results. They recognize that the choice of functional
form and of the explanatory variables in home price equations is some-
what arbitrary. And they stress that some of the variables in these regres-
sions are endogenous, cautioning against taking them as strong evidence
of the importance of fundamentals. In particular, mortgage rates may be
low when home prices are weak, because monetary policy is normally
expansive when economic conditions, including housing demand, are
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be understated. Similarly, housing starts may reﬂect shifts in supply and
therefore have a negative, but underestimated, effect on prices; but they
also respond to shifts in demand, biasing the coefﬁcients upward and pos-
sibly changing their sign. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that, in all the
most price-volatile states except Hawaii, actual home prices greatly
exceed those forecast by the equations for 2000–02, in several cases by
more than 25 percent. The authors conclude that their analysis of funda-
mentals does not reject the hypothesis that a bubble exists in these states. 
Households’ expectations about future housing prices play the domi-
nant role in explaining bubbles. Economists are often skeptical of using
what agents say about their beliefs and behavior, as opposed to prices and
quantities in actual transactions, as evidence to test an economic hypothe-
sis. But Case and Shiller believe that carefully constructed surveys,
administered close to the time when agents make economic decisions, can
be informative. In a previous study in 1988, the authors surveyed 2,030
households in four markets who had recently bought homes; three of
those markets—Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Boston—were booming
at that time, and the fourth, Milwaukee, was stable. For the present paper
they essentially repeated the survey in the same markets in early 2003.
The ﬁrst three markets (which the authors call “glamour” markets) have
experienced similar housing price cycles over the last twenty years. All
three had a housing boom in the late 1980s or early 1990s, with prices
increasing between 1982 and the ﬁrst peak (1988 in Boston, 1989 in Los
Angeles and San Francisco) by more than 125 percent. The bust that fol-
lowed was most severe and longest lasting in Los Angeles, where prices
fell 29 percent to a trough in early 1996, but price declines were also sub-
stantial in the other two. All three have seen a prolonged boom since their
trough, with prices rising by 129 percent in San Francisco, 94 percent in
Los Angeles, and 126 percent in Boston. Housing price behavior in Mil-
waukee could hardly be more different, with a steady climb of roughly 
51/2 percent a year over the period since 1982, in line with the growth of
income per capita in that metropolitan area. Interestingly, over that entire
period, home prices in Milwaukee, although starting and ending substan-
tially lower than in the glamour cities, rose by roughly the same percent-
age as theirs did. 
What caused the recent dramatic rise in prices in the glamour markets?
The authors recognize that the substantial decline in mortgage rates may
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in prices over the period, the carrying cost of a mortgage for 80 percent of
market value is the same or lower today than in 1995 in all three markets.
But they note that these mortgage rate reductions did not have a compara-
ble effect on prices in Milwaukee, and that their regressions that included
mortgage rates still greatly underpredicted the recent price increases in
the glamour markets. In the 1988 survey the authors saw strong evidence
of bubble psychology in the glamour markets: recent homebuyers said
then that they were inﬂuenced by an investment motive, that they
expected extraordinarily high future rates of home price inﬂation, and that
they perceived little risk. They inferred that emotion and casual word of
mouth played a signiﬁcant role in home purchase decisions. The 2003
survey was sent to 2,000 persons in the same four metropolitan areas 
who had bought homes between March and August 2002. The response
rate was 35 percent, about 10 percentage points lower than in 1988. Over 
90 percent of respondents were buying a single-family home as a primary
residence. The proportion who were ﬁrst-time purchasers ranged from
about one-third in Los Angeles to over half in Milwaukee.
The survey was designed to shed light on aspects of homebuyers’
views and behavior that might be relevant to whether or not there was a
bubble in their housing market. In particular, respondents were asked
about their investment motivation, including expectations of future price
rises and the risk of a price collapse, about the extent to which the housing
market was a topic of conversation and source of excitement among their
friends and associates, and about their adherence to popular theories
about housing markets that the authors regard as simplistic or even falla-
cious. The authors hoped to see, among other things, whether the bust that
had intervened since the previous survey had left a clear imprint on cur-
rent psychology.
Case and Shiller suggest that a deﬁning characteristic of a housing bub-
ble is a widespread view on the part of buyers that housing is largely an
investment. They ﬁnd that only a small proportion of respondents in the
glamour markets (7.5 to 10.6 percent) said they had bought strictly for
investment purposes (3 percent or fewer bought to rent to others). In these
markets, which had experienced a bust in the early 1990s, the media had
given much attention to the possibility of a bubble in 2003. So it is not
surprising that these proportions were down (if only slightly) from the
1988 survey. Nonetheless, for the vast majority (from 86 to 92 percent) of
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eration or “in part” a consideration in their purchase. Interestingly, the
total was highest in Milwaukee, the “stable” market. In the glamour mar-
kets the proportion of buyers that perceived a “great deal of ” or “some”
risk increased relative to 1988, most dramatically in San Francisco, where
the proportion seeing a great deal of risk increased from 4.2 percent to
14.8 percent. Although in all cities the proportion that perceived either
“major” or “some” risk was over 55 percent, the authors conclude that the
perceived risk of price decline remains small, and that homebuyers in
general do not perceive themselves to be in a bubble. 
Because unrealistic expectations of future price increases are a deﬁn-
ing feature of bubbles, the authors asked a series of questions exploring
these expectations. A high percentage of respondents expected an
increase in home prices in the next several years. The median expected
increases for the next twelve months were 10 percent in Los Angeles, 
7 percent in San Francisco, and 5 percent in Boston and Milwaukee; the
average expected increases were noticeably higher. However, expecta-
tions for the next ten years were far rosier. The average annual price
increase expected in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Boston was more
than 13 percent, and in Milwaukee it was almost 12 percent. One wonders
whether buyers understand the power of compounding: even in Milwau-
kee the reported expectations imply a tripling of home prices in ten years.
Although the responses in the glamour cities for the next twelve months
were lower than they had been in 1988, the ten-year expectations were
even higher. Fewer respondents in 2003 said that now was a good time to
buy a home because prices may be rising in the future, but at least two-
thirds agreed with the statement in all four cities, and many thought there
was a risk that delay might mean not being able to afford a home later.
The authors also ﬁnd that high percentages of respondents admitted to
being inﬂuenced by “excitement” about home prices and to discussing the
housing market with friends and associates. The authors judge that these
indicators of bubbles were fairly strong in 2003, although generally
weaker in the glamour cities than in 1988, and somewhat stronger in
Milwaukee. 
The authors explore respondents’ agreement with a number of simple
popular theories or stories about booming home prices for further evi-
dence of a bubble mentality. They ﬁnd widespread agreement with the
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ple want to live here.” This suggests that respondents confused a high
level of prices with a high rate of change, but the authors recognize that
respondents may have simply misconstrued the statement. More telling is
that 20 to 40 percent agreed with the statement that “when there is simply
not enough housing available, price becomes unimportant” and that, for
more than half the respondents in the glamour cities, the best explanation
of sellers getting more than one offer on the day they list a property, some
of them over the asking price, was that “there is panic buying and price
becomes irrelevant.” Although these responses suggest that psychology is
a major element in booming markets, the authors report that their respon-
dents did not hold this view. Fifteen percent or fewer said they believed
that the recent price increases reﬂected the psychology of homebuyers
and sellers, and more than 80 percent thought that “economic or demo-
graphic conditions such as population changes, changes in interest rates
or employment” were responsible. These results, together with the fact
that respondents seldom mentioned psychological factors to explain
recent home price changes, provide evidence that they did not believe
themselves to be in a bubble. 
Some observers have linked the beginning of the recent real estate
boom to the stock market collapse that took place at about the same time.
In theory, a stock market collapse could have two opposing effects: a
wealth effect that reduces the demand for other assets, including housing,
and a substitution effect, with a ﬂight to assets of greater perceived qual-
ity, that increases demand for houses. The authors asked several questions
to clarify the stock market’s role. The vast majority of buyers stated that
the stock market “had no effect on my decision to buy my house.”
Between a quarter and a third did state that the market decline “encour-
aged” them to buy a home, and only a very small percentage found it dis-
couraging. Although the authors view the evidence as inconclusive, they
note that many related comments by investors suggested that they had lost
their appetite for stocks with the recent market decline and its volatility
and had come to view real estate more favorably.
A substantial number of the buyers in the survey were also sellers, and
the authors questioned them to learn more about the apparent upward
rigidity of asking prices in boom markets. Forty-ﬁve percent of the
respondents in the San Francisco area reported selling above the asking
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Many sellers thought they would have sold just as quickly if they had
charged 5 to 10 percent more. When asked why they did not ask more, a
surprising number of sellers—a majority in San Francisco and Boston, a
near majority in Milwaukee, and 26 percent in Los Angeles—reported
that it would be unfair, and many said that “the property simply wasn’t
worth that much.” The authors also ﬁnd sellers’ attitudes to be consistent
with the idea that asking prices are rigid downward. 
The authors conclude with their own description of speculative bub-
bles in housing. They recognize that supply and demand for housing are
affected by a large number of fundamental factors, such as demographics,
income, employment, interest rates, and construction costs. Changes in
one or more of these fundamentals can increase demand, putting upward
pressure on prices. But they believe that expectations can amplify these
effects when supply is inelastic. Price increases caused by changes in fun-
damentals can lead buyers to anticipate continued increases in prices, fur-
ther increasing demand and setting off an upward spiral. In this view the
long economic expansion of the 1980s drove up demand in the boom-bust
cities. In the short run the increased demand encountered inelastic supply,
inventories of properties for sale shrank, and vacancies declined, setting
off the boom. As happened in that instance, longer-run forces eventually
reverse the impact of the initial increase in demand and the public’s over-
reaction to it. In some markets new construction can bring new housing
on line in a relatively short time. In other markets, where supply is less
elastic because of a ﬁxed supply of land, or because of zoning or other
restrictions, the price increases themselves are eventually self-limiting, 
in that they make living in the area less desirable, decreasing the labor
supply and discouraging industry. 
Is the present boom in housing prices a bubble, and is there a risk of a
broad collapse that could adversely affect the national economy? The
authors see little risk of such an outcome. They believe the fundamentals
can explain the home price increases observed in most of the United
States since 1995. For more than forty states, income growth alone
explains virtually the entire increase in housing prices, and, in the vast
majority of states, falling interest rates have actually made housing more
affordable than it was in 1995. However, the authors do believe there is
substantial evidence of a bubble psychology at work—high expectations
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and excitement—in the three glamour cities they studied. Although these
indicators are not as strong as they were in the 1980s, and most people in
these areas do not perceive themselves to be in the middle of a bubble, the
authors note that most did not perceive a bubble in 1988 before that bub-
ble burst. The authors believe it is reasonable to suppose that in some of
these glamour cities price increases will stall, and perhaps even decline.
But only in the unlikely event that such price declines are synchronous
and spread to markets in which there is no evidence of a bubble could
they become a signiﬁcant drag on the national economy.
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